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CONSTITUTIONAL PROBLEMS
OF POPULATION CONTROL
The battle to feed humanity is over. In the 1970's the
world will undergo famines-hundreds of millions of people
are going to starve to death in spite of any crash programs
embarked upon now. At this late date nothing can prevent a
substantial increase in the world death rate, although many
lives could be saved through dramatic programs to "stretch"
the carrying capacity of the earth by increasing food produc-
tion. But these programs will only provide a stay of execution
unless they are accompanied by determined and successful
population control.
Prologue
Paul R. Ehrlich, The Population Bomb
I. INTRODUCTION
Procreation and family are sensitive and private aspects of any
citizen's life, and the rights and freedoms in these areas must be
zealously protected from unwarranted infringement. At the same
time, the government must act immediately to implement an
effective population program.
An analysis of the urgency and magnitude of the population
problem would show that both national and human survival de-
pend on limiting man's incredible ability to procreate. The world's
resources are finite; man's consumption of them must be made so,
too, or Malthus' four horsemen will balance the supply and de-
mand for us. If we are not to starve our grandchildren, to leave
them with no immunity to the pestilence of overcrowding and
hopelessness, to kill them with pollution, or to force war upon
them as the only way to secure enough territory to feed a vo-
racious population, we must take decisive action to limit their
numbers now.
If man is to survive, our society and all others must radically
slow down the rate at which human beings are multiplying. In all
countries a national policy of limiting family size is essential, and
inevitably government action will be necessary to carry it out. As
to our country the question is, therefore, how much action en-
couraging or, as a last resort, compelling reproduction control can
the government-local, state, or federal-take without unduly
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abridging those individual freedoms that are protected and se-
cured by the Constitution of the United States.
At one time a human libertarian could say any authoritative
action by the state in an area such as procreation was absolutely
intolerable. John Stewart Mill thus wrote in the last century:
There is a circle around every individual human being which
no government, be it that of one, of a few, or of the many,
ought to be permitted to overstep. There is a part of the life of
every person who has come to years of discretion, within
which the individuality of that person ought to reign uncon-
trolled either by any other individual or by the public collec-
tively.1
While any modern democratic spirit could only agree with and
applaud Mill's thesis as an abstract proposition, the latter day
thinker would be compelled to argue that the area of the circle is
subject to adjustment when the very survival of mankind is at
stake. Deciding the number of children one will have is not now,
or at least should not long remain, completely inside the circle.
The individual today ought not to be allowed to "reign uncon-
trolled" in the area of family planning. The state's interest, and
the interests of all other citizens, in controlling the population
bomb is too great to allow it.
Indeed, the government for its own reasons has already found it
necessary to intervene in several areas involving procreation,
family and sexual life. The Mormons are not free to practice and
advocate polygamy.2 Fornication and adultery are crimes in all
states. Abortion, although the trend is now toward liberalizing
legal restraints, is nonetheless regulated by statute in every state.3
The Mann Act 4 prohibits interstate traffic in prostitution. The
Comstock Acts actually prohibit the importation or mailing of
contraceptives. 5 Every state has minimum age requirements for
marriage, and decides upon what grounds couples may legally
separate or divorce. Every state makes incest a crime. Twenty six
states have eugenic sterilization laws,6 and every state has laws
' J. MILL, PRINCIPLES OF POLITICAL ECONOMY 938 (University of Toronto Press ed.
1965).
2 Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1879).
3 One state, Maryland, was almost an exception. A bill abolishing all abortion laws
passed both houses of the legislature but was vetoed by the governor. N.Y. Times, May
27, 1970, § I at 43, Col.2.
4 18 U.S.C. § 2422 (1970).
5 Importation, 18 U.S.C. §1462 (1970); Mailing, 18 U.S.C. §1461 (1970); 19 U.S.C. §
1305 (a) (1965).
6 Ferster, Eliminating the Unfit: Is Sterilization the Answer, 27 OHIO ST.L.J. 591, 596
(1966).
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detailing the procedures and requirements for adoption. There-
fore, it is inaccurate to say the state has been unwilling to invade
the private spheres of sexual conduct of its citizens and the
stability of family life. Only the motivation is different in the
population control area; while most of the foregoing examples of
state regulation are based on ideas of morality, a population
control program has as its motivation the survival of mankind.
Given the present population situation the latter justification is the
stronger one, and government action is not only permissible, it is
essential.
Assuming then that the government should act to control popu-
lation, it must be determined whether and how it can act within
the framework of the Constitution. In the United States, the
relevant constitutional limitations on government's power are
found mainly in guaranties of individual rights and freedoms in the
Bill of Rights and the Fourteenth Amendment. Therefore, the
individual's rights under various amendments will be considered.
They include the right to the free exercise of religion, 7 to life,8 to
marital privacy,9 to marry and raise a family, 10 to be free from
arbitrary restraint by the government,1 and to equal protection of
the laws. 12 Finally, the rights retained by the states will be consid-
ered where they are relevant in determining whether federal gov-
ernment action is constitutionally permissible. After all these
questions have been discussed, suggestions of possible govern-
mental programs will be presented.
II. THE FREE EXERCISE AND ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSES
Governmental encouragement of population control would
doubtless be challenged under the religion clauses of the First
Amendment, which provides in part:
Congress shall make no law. . . respecting an estab-
lishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof.
7 "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the
free exercise thereof;..." U.S. CONST. amend. I.
8,,... nor shall any state deprive any person of life, liberty or property, without due
process of law; .... U.S. CONST. amend. XIV. See also U.S. CONST. amend. V, when
the same prohibition is applied to the federal government.
9 This right was first articulated by a majority of the court in Griswold v. Connecticut,
381 U.S. 479 (1965). See text accompanying notes 54 to 68 infra.
10A right to procreate has not been recognized in any decision, but Mr. Justice
Goldberg's opinion in Griswold assumes that such a right exists and several earlier cases
suggest it. See text accompanying notes 69 to 79 infra.
I U.S. CONST. amends. V, XIV.
12 " ... nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws,"
U.S. CONST. amend XIV.
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The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment makes
the First Amendment religious freedom guaranties applicable to
the states.13 Both Roman Catholics and some Orthodox Jews
believe their religions prohibit the use of any artificial con-
traception methods. 14 If the state were to encourage with special
incentives the use of birth control methods, or to penalize those
who have more than a certain number of children, both groups
could claim such action constituted either an establishment of
religion or an infringement of their right to the free exercise of
religion.
Precedent makes it unlikely that either contention would be
sustained as long as the provisions of the applicable statute were
reasonable. First, with respect to the Establishment Clause con-
tention, the challenger's position would be that some religions
allow the use of contraceptive devices and drugs and some do not.
To encourage use of birth control methods, or to burden those
who do not use them and who consequently have had more
children than the state deems advisable, would therefore prefer
one religion over another. State action giving such a preference
was said to violate the Establishment Clause in Everson v. Board
of Education.15
This line of reasoning is not persuasive. A challenger whose
religion either allows or requires the use of birth control could
make the same contentions as those above in an attempt to
invalidate such laws as the Comstock Acts or state statutes limit-
ing the availability of birth control information and devices.
Therefore, any law that deals with birth control amounts to a
preference of one religion over another simply because religions
have different views on the matter. More importantly, it is the
state's purpose in enacting legislation and the subsequent effect of
13 The Free Exercise Clause was made applicable in Cantwell v. Connecticut, 3 10 U.S.
296 (1940); the Establishment Clause was first used to invalidate a state practice in
McCollum v. Board of Education, 333 U.S. 203 (1948).
14 The Orthodox Jew's belief is based on the scriptures. Gensis 1:22 commands: "Be
fruitful and multiply, and fill the waters in the seas, and let fowl multiply upon the earth."
Although it is perhaps irreverent to so comment, it should be noted that God had not yet
created man when he made that statement. Genesis 8:17 is a similar passage, and again
God, who is speaking to Noah, refers directly to lower members of the animal kingdom:
"Bring forth with thee every living thing that is with thee, of all flesh, both of fowl, and of
cattle, and of every living thing that creepeth upon the earth; that they may breed
abundantly in the earth and be fruitful and multiply." However, Exodus 21:22-23 pro-
vides: "If men strive, and hurt a woman with child, so that her fruit depart from her, and
yet no mischief follow: he shall be surely punished, according as the woman's husband will
lay upon him; and he shall pay as the judges determine. And if an mischief follow, thou
shalt give life for life."
The Catholic Church's position is based on the Pope's position as the interpreter of
natural law for his church. It is the Pope's view that natural law does not permit the use of
artificial birth control devices. N.Y. Times, July 30,1968, § 1, at 20, col. 1.
15 330 U.S. at 15.
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the legislation that is crucial under the Establishment Clause. As
stated by the Supreme Court in Abington School District v.
Schempp:16
[T]o withstand the strictures of the Establishment Clause
three must be a secular legislative purpose and a primary
effect that neither advances nor inhibits religion. 17
A population control program could surely satisfy this test. Its
dominant purpose would be to control a national problem, not to
favor or burden any particular religion or sect. Certainly, its
primary effect-reducing the number of new births in this coun-
try-would be secular and not religious. State aid to parochial
schools has been sustained over establishment objections on a
"secular purpose" theory,' 8 and it seems clear that the theory
could be used to sustain population control programs as well.
Turning to the free exercise issue, it has been held that an
individual's rights under the Free Exercise Clause may be re-
stricted if the state has a clear-and compelling reason for abridging
them. While comparing the rights of an individual under the Free
Exercise Clause and the Establishment Clause in Cantwell, the
Supreme Court stated:
The constitutional inhibition of legislation on the subject of
religion has a double aspect. On the one hand, it forestalls
compulsion by law of the acceptance of any creed or the
practice of any form of worship .... On the other hand, it
safeguards the free exercise of [the individual's] chosen form
'of religion. Thus the Amendment embraces two con-
cepts,-freedom to believe and freedom to act. The first is
absolute but, in the nature of things, the second cannot be.19
In Reynolds v. United States,20 the Court upheld federal laws
making the advocacy and practice of polygamy a crime. In re-
sponse to the defendant's claim that the laws abridged his right to
freely practice his religion as a member of the Mormon Church,
the Court stated:
Laws are made for the government of actions, and while they
cannot interfere with mere religious belief and opinions, they
may with practices. 21
Thus, the Free Exercise Clause is no barrier to legislation in-
16374 U.S. 203 (1963).
17 374 U.S. at 222.
18 See, for example, Board of Education v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236 (1968).
19 310 U.S. at 303-304.
2098 U.S. 145 (1879).
21 98 U.S. at 166.
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hibiting one's religiously-dictated private action when it is in-
consistent with a compelling policy of the state.
A recent case, however, makes this a less foregone conclusion
than it once was. In Sherbert v. Verner,22 the Court, in a 7 to 2
decision, held unconstitutional a provision of the South Carolina
Unemployment Act which, as applied, withheld benefits from
those applicants who were unavailable for work. The state
claimed the petitioner was unavailable because she refused to
accept jobs that would have required her to work on Saturday.
The petitioner was a Seventh Day Adventist and, thus, validly
claimed her religion proscribed Saturday work. The Court held
that denying her benefits because she would not accept Saturday
employment abridged her rights under the Free Exercise Clause.
If Sherbert means that an exemption to a general law requiring
a certain action must be carved out for those who refuse to
comply on religious grounds, the very essence of any population
control legislation could be defeated by exempting the Catholics
and the Orthodox Jews and the members of any other sect whose
religion proscribes contraception. Yet Sherbert does not make
one's rights under the Clause absolute. The Court still considered
"whether some compelling state interest... justifies the substan-
tial infringement of the appellant's First Amendment right." 23 The
majority in Sherbert found no such compelling state interest.
South Carolina had not shown that job applicants made, or would
hereafter make, fraudulent religious claims in order to avoid work
and yet continue to receive unemployment compensation. In
other words, the state could run its unemployment compensation
program effectively without denying unemployment compensation
benefits to those who refused to accept Saturday work on reli-
gious grounds. To the contrary, as previously indicated, the gov-
ernment could not run an effective population control program if
religious exemptions were granted. Assuming a population control
program is necessary for national survival, the state's interest is
clearly compelling and therefore superior to the individual's Free
Exercise claims. The Court faced this type of situation in an
earlier case, Braunfeld v. Brown,24 when it upheld a Sunday
closing law and the government's refusal to exempt the petitioner,
whose religion required him to close his business on Saturdays. In
Sherbert the Court distinguished the state interests involved in the
two cases stating:
22374 U.S. 398 (1963).
374 U.S. at 406.
24366 U.S. 599 (1961).
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The [Braunfeld] Court recognized that the Sunday closing
law which that decision sustained undoubtedly served, 'to
make the practice of [petitioner's] ... religious beliefs more
expensive .... . But the statute was nevertheless saved by a
countervailing factor which finds no equivalent in the instant
case-a strong state interest in providing one uniform day of
rest for all workers. That secular objective could be achieved,
the Court found, only by declaring Sunday to be that day of
rest. Requiring exemptions for Sabbatarians, while theo-
retically possible, appeared to present an administrative prob-
lem of such magnitude, or to afford the exempted class so
great a competitive advantage, that such a requirement would
have rendered the entire statutory scheme unworkable.25
If administrative problems and competitive advantage could sus-
tain the "no exemption" policy of Braunfeld, surely national sur-
vival can sustain a no exemption population program.
A final argument for upholding a government-sponsored popu-
lation control program over an individual's free exercise objec-
tions is found among the string of Jehovah's Witnesses cases. In
Prince v. Massachusetts2 6 the Supreme Court upheld application
of Massachusetts' child labor laws in the case of a child who was
encouraged by her guardian to sell religious tracts and preach on
street corners. The guardian claimed that enforcement of the
statute would infringe her right to raise her ward in the way she
thought best and the child's right to the free exercise of her
religion. The Court, rejecting both contentions on the ground that
the state's interest in protecting its children overrode both in-
dividuals' claims, stated:
But the family itself is not beyond regulation in the public
interest, as against a claim of religious liberty. And neither
rights of religion nor rights of parenthood are beyond limita-
tion.27
It is reasonable to conclude that the parens patriae principles
upon which the legislation in Princ, was sustained could similarly
be used to sustain population control legislation.
To rely on Prince to uphold a population control program,
however, the government would have to use a two-stage analysis
and prevail at each stage. First, it would have to establish that one
25 374 U.S. at 408-409. Note, however, that in Sherbert Mr. Justice Stewart, concurring,
and Mr. Justices Harlan and White, dissenting, thought the majority opinion in Sherbert
was inconsistent with Braunfeld and therefore overruled it. See text accompanying notes
24-25 supra. As is obvious from the quote, the majority felt the cases were distinguishable.
26321 U.S. 158 (1944).
27321 U.S. at 166.
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purpose of population control legislation is to protect existing
children. A possible argument the government might present is
that in failing to control the spiraling growth of the nation's youth
population, with the consequent exhaustion of the national wel-
fare, educational, medical and housing resources, the state cannot
be said to be discharging those parens patriae obligations imposed
upon it by the law. Second, if this parens patriae purpose were
granted to a population control program, the government would
have to contend that in the interest of protecting its children the
state can abridge the rights of adults to freely exercise their
religion. Although the Prince decision primarily concerned the
conflicts between the religious liberty of the child and parens
patriae principles, the court did abridge the guardian's right to
"bring up the child in the way he should go, which for [the
guardian] means to teach him the tenets and practices of their
faith."2 8 To this extent, Prince lends support to the proposition
that a fundamental right of the parent can be abridged if necessary
to protect the child. Unless, therefore, the adult's free exercise
right is to be accorded more protection than his parental right to
bring up his children as he sees fit, Prince indicates that the
parens patriae doctrine can be used to sustain legislation even if it
abridges a parent's free exercise rights. Although the Supreme
Court has never ruled on such a case, lower federal and state
decisions in the blood transfusion cases have allowed the state to
abridge an adult's free exercise rights on parens patriae
grounds.2 9
III. DUE PROCESS
A. Protections Owed the Unborn Child
The due process afforded by population control legislation may
be divided into questions of the protections owed the unborn child
and protections owed the parents. The child's right to due process
is arguably abridged by abortion reform legislation, where the
28321 U.S. at 165.
29 See, for example, Application of President & Directors of Georgetown College, Inc.,
118 App. D.C. 80, 331 F.2d 1000, reh. denied 118 App. D.C. 90, 331 F.2d 1010, cert.
denied 377 U.S. 978 (1964), where the mother of a seven-month-old child was required to
accept a blood transfusion even though her religion proscribed the injection of blood into
the body. Without the transaction she should have died, and the judge who ordered the
transfusion believed the state as parents patriae had an interest in preserving her life.
Accord or similar facts, United States v. George, 239 F. Supp. 752 (D.C. Conn. 1965). It
should be noted that in several cases in which the hospital or doctor was denied the right
to administer a blood transfusion over a patient's reglgious objections, the patient had no
minor children. See In re Brooks' Estate, 32 I1. 2d 361, 205 N.E. 2d 435 (1965), and
Erickson v. Delgard, 44 Misc. 2d 27, 252 N.Y.S. 2d 705 (1962).
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basis for any constitutional challenge would no doubt revolve
around allegations that the child was deprived of his life without
due process of law. The question might arise, for example, under
an abortion statute enabling a wife to obtain an abortion without
her husband's consent. If the abortion is performed over the
husband's 'objections he might subsequently sue the abortionist
for wrongful death, asserting the child's rights under a survival
statute. It is true that for some purposes a fetus has rights and is
therefore a legally cognizable person. For example, the "unborn
child" has inheritance rights,30 and can recover for tortious pre-
natal injuries. 3' In some jurisdictions, the fetus need not have
been viable at the time of injury in order to recover. 32 In at least
one jurisdiction the nonviable fetus need not be born alive in
order to recover.3 3 Based partly on these considerations, but
primarily on religious, philosophical, or moral ones, some com-
mentators and courts have argued that an embryo or zygote-the
fertilized egg during the earliest stages of pregnancy-is a person
under the Fourteenth Amendment and, thus, has a right not to be
deprived of life without due process of law, i.e., a right to be born.
One commentator, 34 for example, stated that in all but the most
extreme emergency situations, to legalize abortions would deny
the fetus its right to life without due process of law. In Gleitman
v. CosgroveM5 the parents of a blind and retarded child sought to
recover damages for the emotional and financial damages suffered
because of the child's birth. During the early part of her preg-
nancy, the mother had contracted measles in the defendant hospi-
tal, and both the hospital and the defendant physician failed to
inform the parents of the likelihood that this could result in the
child being born defective. Plaintiffs argued that this failure pre-
cluded the parents from making a decision to abort. Denying
recovery, the New Jersey Supreme Court stated:
Though we sympathize with the unfortunate situation in
which these parents find themselves, we firmly believe the
30T. ATKINSON, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF WILLS 52 (2 ed. 1953).
31 Woods v. Lancet, 303 N.Y. 349, 102 N.E. 2d 691 (1951). Infant plaintiff alleged
defendant negligently injured him while he was still in his mother's womb with the result
that he was born permanently disabled.
32 303 N.Y. 349 (1951).
33 Porter v. Lassiter, 91 Ga. App. 712, 87 S.E. 2d 100 (1955). Plaintiff mother sued for
damages for death of unborn fetus, caused she said, by negligence of defendant truck
driver. She alleged the placenta had been damaged in the accident and that this caused her
to abort.
34 Herbert, Is Legalized Abortion the Solution to Criminal Abortion?, 37 COLO. L. REV.
283, 285 (1965).
3 49 N.J. 22, 227 A.2d 689 (1967).
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right of their child to live is greater than and precludes their
right not to endure emotional and financial injury.36
Similarly, the Ohio Supreme Court, in Williams v. Marion
Rapid Transit, Inc.,3 7 held that a viable fetus is a person under
the Ohio Constitution, and a New Jersey court once stayed the
execution of a pregnant woman until after childbirth.3 8 The blood
transfusion cases, in which gravely ill pregnant women with reli-
gious reasons for refusing to take blood transfusions are never-
theless given them in order to save their unborn child, also ar-
guably stand for the proposition that a fetus has a right to be
born.3 9
In spite of the above decisions and rules of law, others argue
that an unborn child is not a person under the Fourteenth Amend-
ment, or at least is not one for all purposes at the moment of
conception. In no case has a court held that the protections of the
Fourteenth Amendment reach a fetus. 40 Second, existing abortion
laws in several states allow abortions to be performed whenever a
continued pregnancy endangers the mother's life. Thus, in at least
some jurisdictions, the right of the fetus to live is subordinate to
the mother's right to live. 4 1 Third, although some abortions are
criminal in almost every state, the penalty imposed upon con-
viction is, without exception, less severe than that imposed for
intentional homicide. 42
The American Law Institute in its Model Penal Code seeks to
resolve this question by regarding the fetus' right to live as in-
choate until quickening. The Institute's commentator states that
before quickening-which typically occurs between the sixteenth
and eighteenth weeks of pregnancy 43-the developing fetus is "an
36 49 N.J. at 3 1.
37 152 Ohio 114, 87 N.E. 2d 334 (1949). Infant plaintiff alleged she received permanent
injuries through defendant's negligence when, as a viable fetus in her mother's womb, she
was injured when her mother fell alighting from a bus.3 8 See State v. Cooper, 220 N.J.L. 52, 51 Am. Dec. 77 (1949).
39 See, for example, Raleigh-Fitkin Paul Morgan Memorial Hospital v. Anderson, 42
N.J. 421, 201 A.2d 537, cert. denied, 377 U.S. 985 (1964).
40 Reingold, Abortion Reform in New York: A Study of Religious, Moral, Medica and
Legal Conflict, 31 ALBANY L. REV. 290, 298 (1967).
41 Other states allow abortions to be performed in cases of forcible rape or incest.
These, too, show that the right of the child to live is not absolute. See, for example, Cal.
Health Safety Code § 25951 (c) (2) (1970).
42 It might be noted that at common law performing abortions before the quickening of
the fetus was not criminal. See Rex v. Bourne, I K.B. 687 (1938). The first criminal
abortion statute passed in this country was enacted in Connecticut in 1821. It made no
distinction between pre- and post-quickening abortions; both were criminal. L. LADER,
ABORTION I n.6 (1966).
43 DORLANDS ILLUSTRATED MEDICAL DICTIONARY (24th ed. 1965).
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inchoate being, whose chance of maturing is somewhat problema-
tical." 44 If the ALI "inchoate" idea becomes generally accepted,
the constitutionality of prescribing abortifacient drugs and devices
("the morning after pill" and the loop or IUD) would no longer be
questioned. As it is, advocates of the life-begins-at-conception
view argue that the sale or prescription of such products violates
state abortion laws.
Nevertheless, no one now predicts that courts will accept the
ALI test. Should the courts instead demand rights of life for the
unborn before quickening, the abortifacient drugs and devices as
well as the spate of new liberalized abortion statutes will all be of
dubious constitutionality. As Professor David Louisell puts it:
In order to make the question of the legitimacy of an
abortion solely a medical judgment [that is, one to be decided
by the woman and her physician when the latter has been
asked to prescribe an abortifacient or perform an abortion], it
must be assumed that no human life, other than that of the
mother, is involved in the termination of pregnancy. 45
It cannot be denied that Louisell has logic on his side, for
on the one hand [the law] protects the unborn from the tort
feasor who is only negligent, yet [on the other, it] subjects
him to deliberate destruction at the will of his mother.46
But as Oliver Wendell Holmes said:
The life of the law has not been logic: it has been ex-
perience. 47
And experience shows that the law cannot reasonably hope to
prevent women from obtaining abortions. 48
44 MODEL PENAL CODE § 207.11, Comment I(g) (Tent. Draft No. 9, 1959). Some
courts have gone much farther than the Institute recommends in this area. See, for
example, Leavy and Kummer, Abortion and the Population Crisis, 27 OHIo ST. L.J. 647,
676 (1966), where the authors discuss a nameless California case in which the court
ordered an abortion performed on a minor girl who was in her first month of pregnancy.
The court also conditioned its order on her parents' consenting to sterilization of the girl.
45 Louisell, Abortion, the Practice of Medicine and the Due Process of Law., 16
U.C.L.A.L. REV. 233, 246 (1969).
46 Id. at 249.
470. HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW (1881).
48 Statistics on the number of criminal abortions performed yearly in this country
abound. All are estimates at best, and most reflect the bias of the persons presenting them.
John T. Noonan, Jr., is not unjustified when he complains he has found no rational basis
for deciding whether 40,000 or 200,000, or one million criminal abortions are performed
each year in the United States. See Noonan, Amendment of the Abortion Law: Relevant
Data and Judicial Opinion, 15 CATH. LAW. 124, 132 (1969). In any case, a significant
number of women of child-bearing age are not now deterred from seeking an abortion by
the existence of a law that makes such an operation illegal.
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B. Protections Owed the Parents
Government action encouraging family size limitation could be
subject to a substantive due process challenge under the Fifth
and/or Fourteenth Amendment. The state may subject the rights
of an individual to reasonable restraint under its police power to
protect the public health, safety, order, or morals. 49 To be reason-
able, however, and consistent with the principles of due process,
the restraint must not be:
arbitrary, discriminatory, or demonstrably irrelevant to the
policy the legislature is free to adopt, and hence an unneces-
sary and unwarranted interference with individual liberty. 50
Recent cases suggest that if the right abridged is a personal
fundamental right such as freedom of speech, any significant
abridgement of it will be unreasonable unless
the state ... show[s] a subordinating interest that is clear and
compelling.51
Further, the statute affecting the abridgement cannot be unneces-
sarily broad. As stated by Justice Harlan in N.A.A.C.P. v. Ala-
bama:52
[A] governmental purpose to control or prevent activities
constitutionally subject to state regulation may not be
achieved by means which sweep unnecessarily broadly and
thereby invade the area of protected freedoms. 53
Any action the government takes to control population would
be an exercise of the police power, having as its object the
protection of both the public health and safety. Social and de-
mographic data abound to show that both interests are adversely
affected by over population. Therefore, since a population control
program could be shown to have a valid purpose, it becomes
crucial to determine whether such a program's operation would
49 Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11 (1905). The defendant unsuccessfully chal-
lenged the constitutionality of a state compulsory vaccination statute saying that he was
denied equal protection of the laws and deprived of his liberty without due process, and
that his privileges and immunities as a U.S. citizen were abridged.50 Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502, 539 (1934).
51 Bates v. Little Rock, 361 U.S. 561, 524 (1960), a first amendment case in which the
defendants had been convicted of violating a municipal ordinance which required men to
file membership lists with the city. The ordinance was declared unconstitutional, violating
the freedom of association guarantee of the first amendment, made applicable to the states
by the fourteenth amendment. Cited by Goldberg, J., in a due process context in Griswold,
supra note 9, at 497.
52 377 U.S. 288 (1964), a first amendment case quoted in Griswold, 381 U.S. at 485.
53 377 U.S. at 307.
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abridge any individual fundamental rights. Two possible funda-
mental rights are involved: the right to marital privacy and the
right to procreate.
1. Marital Privacy
Although earlier cases had suggested a right of personal privacy
or privacy of the home, Griswold v. Connecticut54 was the
Court's first definitive declaration of a right to marital privacy.
The case involved Connecticut statutes prohibiting the use of
contraceptive drugs or devices55 and the state's general aiding and
abetting statute.56 Defendants, operators of a Planned Parenthood
clinic, had been convicted for dispensing information, instruction,
and medical advice about contraception to married persons. Mr.
Justice Douglas, speaking for the Court, traced the source of the
right to "penumbras formed by emanations" from the rights guar-
anteed in the First, Third, Fourth, Fifth, and Ninth Amend-
ments. 57 Mr. Justice Goldberg, joined by Mr. Justice Brennan and
Mr. Chief Justice Warren, agreed with the Douglas penumbra
rights approach, but also found support for that approach in the
Ninth Amendment. 58 The Ninth Amendment provides:
The enumeration in the Constitution of certain rights, shall
not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the
people.
Mr. Justice Harland and Mr. Justice White joined the majority,
each relying on his own interpretation of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment Due Process Clause. Mr. Justice Harlan's opinion recog-
nized marital privacy as a fundamental right protected by the Due
Process Clause. 59 Mr. Justice White, on the other hand, found
that the birth control statute was an arbitrary infringement on the
liberty of married couples. Refering to the state's avowed purpose
in enacting the statute, i.e. to discourage illicit sexual conduct,
Mr. Justice White said:
I wholly fail to see how the ban on the use of contraceptives
by married couples in any way reinforces the state's ban on
illicit sexual relationships. 60
5 See the cases cited in Mr. Justice Douglas' opinion for the Court in Griswold, 38 1
U.S. at 482-485 (1965).
SCONN. GEN. STAT. REV. § 53-32 (1958).56 CONN. GEN. STAT. REV. 1§ 54-196 (1958)..
57 381 U.S. at 484.
58381 U.S. at 490-493.
59 381 U.S. at 500.
60 381 U.S. at 505.
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In total then, six Justices recognized that a right of marital
privacy is created somewhere in the Constitution. 61 To say that
such a right exists, however, does not define the right, and the
Court's opinion fails to offer any clear definition.' Mr. Justice
Douglas confined his description of the scope of the right to
conjuring up visions of Connecticut policemen searching citizens'
bedrooms looking "for telltale signs of the use of con-
traceptives." 62 It has never been denied that a right of marital
privacy would at the least proscribe that activity. The problem,
however, is to determine the limits of the right. One commentator
has suggested that if Griswold means
a state may not invade marital privacy by forbidding con-
traception, it seems to follow that it may not require con-
traception .... It therefore appears that the Court in Gris-
wold, by resting its decision on marital privacy rather than
substantive due process, may have erected a substantial con-
stitutional obstacle to our adoption of effective population
policies.63
Yet it is not certain that Griswold need be read to extend the right
to marital privacy so far as to bar state-encouraged population
control programs. Although the Court does not hint that any First
Amendment considerations of freedom of speech or press were
even considered in the decision, the facts of the case present a
substantial freedom of speech issue. The defendants were con-
victed for giving contraception "information, instruction, and
medical advice to married persons." 64 Thus, Griswold could be
limited in the future to holding that married couples have a right
of marital privacy which includes a right of access to birth control
information. 65 Moreover, the facts necessarily involved the physi-
cian's right to practice medicine as he thinks best, for the defen-
dants in operating the clinics "examined the wife and prescribed
the best contraceptive device or material for her use." 66 Therefore
61 Three Justices did not recognize such a right. Besides Mr. Justice White, whose
concurring opinion has been discussed in the text, Mr. Justice Black and Mr. Justice
Stewart found nothing in the Constitution establishing a right to marital privacy. see
Griswold, supra note 9, at 508 and 530.
62 381 U.S. at 485.
63 Clark. Law as an Instrument of Population Control, 40 COLo. L. REV. 179. 194
(1968).
64 381 U.S. at 480.
6 See Dixon. The Griswold Penumbra: Constitutional Character for an Expanded Law
of Privacv. 64 MICH. L. REV. 197, 214 (1965), who states:
By invoking the married couples' fictional fear of prosecution for use of
contraceptives to give the clinic defendants standing to defend themselves
from actual prosecution for giving advice, the Court tied marital privacy and
access to information together into a single bundle of rights.
66381 U.S. at 480.
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the holding could be limited to stand only for the proposition that
the state cannot interfere with the physician's right to prescribe
birth control methods if he thinks it good medical practice to do
SO.
Finally, the holding in Griswold might also be limited to the
assertion that in the absence of an expressed state policy of
population control, a married couple's right to privacy includes
the right to determine when they will have children and how many
they will have.67 If Griswold is interpreted this way, the couple's
right can be said to exist absolutely only insofar as it is consistent
with any explicit state policy. To say that "no government is
permitted to compel the coming together of the egg and spermato-
zoon," 68 is not to say that no government is permitted to forbid it.
If the state's reason for enacting a birth control statute is clear
and compelling, the right to marital privacy should be restricted to
a scope consistent with state policy.
2. Right to Procreate
Any law that effectively discouraged couples from having more
than a certain number of children would be challenged as an
abridgement of the right to procreate. Such a right may exist, but
it has not, as yet, been expressly recognized in any court decision.
Dictum in Mr. Justice Goldberg's opinion in Griswold, however,
assumes that the right is given by the Constitution:
Surely, the Government, absent a showing of a compelling
subordinating interest, could not decree that all husbands and
wives must be sterilized after two children have been born to
them .... [N]o provision of the Constitution specifically pre-
vents the government from curtailing the marital right to bear
children or raise a family ... [But] it is . . . shocking to be-
lieve that the personal liberty guaranteed by the Constitution
does not include protection against such totalitarian limitation
of family size, which is at complete variance with our con-
stitutional concepts.6 9
Cases prior to Griswold strengthen the proposition that a fun-
damental right to procreate exists. In Meyer v. Nebraska, 70 the
Court, considering the nature of the right protected under the
Fourteenth Amendment, said:
67 Only one of the majority justices in Griswold even mentioned that a state might have
a legitimate policy of either limiting Or promoting population growth, and he was speaking
only for himself. See Mr. Justice White's concurring opinion at 505.
68 Lucas. Federal Constitutional Limitations on Enforcement and Administration of
State Abortion Statutes, 46 N. C. L. REV. 730, 759 (1968).
69381 U.S. at 496-497.
70 262 U.S. 390 (1923), a case involving a state statute that prohibited the teaching of
foreign languages in Nebraska schools.
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While this Court has not attempted to define with exactness
the liberty thus guaranteed, the term has received much con-
sideration and some of the included things have been defi-
nitely stated. Without doubt, it denotes not merely freedom
from bodily restraint but also the right ... to marry, establish
a home, and bring up children .... 71
And certainly, when judged by the "traditions and conscience of
our people," the right to procreate is a principle "so rooted ... as
to be fundamental.- 72
On the other hand, the case of Buck v. Bell,73 creates some
doubt as to the existence of this fundamental right. In Bell, Mr.
Justice Holmes felt that if the state could require a citizen to risk
his life in war, it could require another citizen to be sterilized
when that citizen was mentally retarded, had a mentally retarded
parent, had already given birth to one retarded child, and was a
ward of the state in a state institution. The state purse was the
only public interest involved, and the sterilization was authorized
because, "[t]hree generations of idiots are enough." 74 Thus, if
there is a fundamental right to procreate Buck v. Bell would
probably have to be overruled. Although the Court has not de-
cided a case which squarely raised the issue in more than
twenty-five years,7 5 Buck v. Bell is still good law supporting the
constitutionality 76 on any government-sponsored program of pop-
ulation control.
However, even the existence of a fundamental right to pro-
create would not necessarily be fatal to such a program. First, we
do not know how broad the right is. It might be limited in much
the same way as the right of marital privacy, in that the right to
procreate might be found to exist absolutely only so long as it is
consistent with state policy. 77 Second, recognition of the right
only means that (1) the state has the burden of establishing the
existence of a compelling state interest subordinating the right,
and (2) the state must use means to achieve its purpose that are
not overly broad. In other words, a statute codifying population
policy must stand up under "strict scrutiny" by the judiciary.7 8
71 262 U.S. at 399.
72 Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 105 (1934).
73 274 U.S. 200 (1927).
74 274 U.S. at 207.
I The last, Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson, 316 U.S. 535 (1942), was decided
on equal protection grounds. Skinner successfully challenged the Oklahoma statute provid-
ing for sterilization of certain kinds of habitual offenders, but not others.7 6 Clark, supra note 63, at 193.
77 See Clark, supra note 63, at 203.
78 Concurring opinion of Mr. Justice White in Griswold, supra note 9, at 504, quoting
Skinner v. Oklahoma, supra note 75, at 54 1.
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As a political matter, by the time a statute actively promoting
birth control becomes politically feasible, the compelling nature of
the state's interest will be apparent and of concern to the public.
Just when the public will have become concerned enough about
the population explosion to accept state action to control it, no
one can say. 79
IV. EQUAL PROTECTION
The equal protection attack on population control legislation
would be similar to the challenges discussed above in the substan-
tive due process context. State action is required to establish a
violation of the equal protection guaranty of the Fourteenth
Amendment.80 When no fundamental right is involved, legislation
or other state action can be sustained over equal protection objec-
tives if the classification that it establishes has a "reasonable
basis." 81 However, when legislation abridges a fundamental right,
it will be upheld only if it is not arbitrary, and is "necessary to
promote a compelling governmental interest." 82
This same kind of standard was cited supra in the First Amend-
ment and Due Process sections. Its citation in this context de-
monstrates how closely the Court will scrutinize any action in-
fringing and individual fundamental right regardless of whether it
originates in the First, Fourth, Fifth, Ninth or Fourteenth
Amendment. 83 Although verbalization of the standard may vary
slightly, the burden that the state must overcome to validate its
actions is essentially the same whenever a fundamental right is
being abridged.
Equal protection arguments against the constitutionality of pop-
ulation control measures could emerge from several directions,
depending on the operation of the statute itself. If, for example,
the program were a limitation on tax exemptions, a middle class
taxpayer, burdened financially by the new tax law could assert a
denial of equal protection because such a law would not burden
I Senator Packwood of Oregon thinks the time has come. He has introduced in
Congress a bill to amend the Revenue Code of the District of Columbia by limiting the
number of exemptions granted for children to two for each family. S.3632, 9 1st Cong., 2d
Sess. (1970).
8 0 Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883).
81 Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U.S. 61, 78 (1911).
82 Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 638 (1969). [Emphasis in the original]. Shapiro
was a challenge to residency requirements for receiving welfare assistance. The require-
ments were held to be invalid as a burden on the constitutional right to travel, and as a
denial of equal protection of the laws.
83 For example, Mr. Justice Goldberg cites Bates v. Little Rock. supra note 5 1. and
McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184. both First Amendment cases, in Griswold, supra
note 9 at 497, in a substantive due process context.
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one with fewer children. In view of past Supreme Court decisions,
this argument probably will not prevail. In Stebbins v. Riley,84
the Court upheld a graduated state inheritance tax law against the
taxpayer's claim that it denied him equal protection. Although
state, rather than federal, legislation was involved, the Court's
response to the plaintiff's claim is apropos to our hypothetical
taxpayer:
The guarantee of the Fourteenth Amendment of the equal
protection of the laws is not a guarantee of equality of oper-
ation or application of state legislation upon all citizens of a
State... The taxing statute may, therefore, make a classifica-
tion for purposes of fixing the amount or incidence of the tax,
provided only that all persons subjected to such legislation
within the classification are treated with equality and ... that
the classification itself be rested upon some ground of
difference having a fair and substantial relation to the object
of the legislation.15
If, on the other hand, legislation were passed limiting or reduc-
ing the amount of welfare payments a recipient could receive after
she has two children, the welfare mother might argue that the
classification of the third child as one too many was arbitrary. In
Dandridge v. Williams,8 6 a welfare recipient unsuccessfully made
this argument, asserting that Maryland's maximum grant limita-
tion for welfare payments was discriminatory and arbitrary. The
court below had held the limitation violated the Equal Protection
Clause because it was too broad. The Supreme Court, holding
that the overreaching doctrine had been erroneously applied, re-
versed in a 5 to 3 decision, stating:
In the area of economics and social welfare, a state does
not violate the Equal Protection Clause merely because the
classifications made by its laws are imperfect. If the classifi-
cation has some 'reasonable basis,' it does not offend the
Constitution simply because the classification is not made
with mathematical nicety or because in practice it results in
4 268 U.S. 137 (1925). The plaintiff, as successor to a relatively large legacy, argued
that he was denied equal protection since the tax law required him to pay a dis-
proportionately higher amount than persons inheriting a smaller legacy.
85 268 U.S. at 142. See also Magoun v. Illinois Trust and Savings Bank, 170 U.S. 283
(1898), upholding a state inheritance tax law challenged on equal protection grounds which
granted exemptions and setting rates based on the total amount of the legacy and on the
beneficiary's relationship to the decedent. See also Bromley v. McCaughn, 280 U.S. 124
(1929), upholding the constitutionality under the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process
and Equal Protection Clause of the graduated federal gift tax statute.
a397 U.S. 471 (1970).
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some inequality. Linsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 220
U.S. 61, 78.87
The majority rejected the plaintiff's contention that regulations
affecting individuals, as opposed to business or industry, require a
stronger state interest. The Court admitted that the 'rational basis'
cases it relied upon were cases in which commercial rights were
being regulated, stating:
The administration of public welfare assistance, by contrast,
involves the most basic economic needs of impoverished hu-
man beings. We recognize the dramatically real factual
difference between the cited cases and this one, but we can
find no basis for applying a different constitutional stan-
dard. 8
Although it would be unwise to predict a retreat from the
Court's dual standard-reasonable and necessary to promote a
compelling state interest-for applying the Equal Protection and
Due Process Clauses on the basis of one decision, Dandridge
does seem to stand for the proposition that when the government
is enacting social welfare legislation, it need only have a rational
basis for its action. It should also be noted that one of the
justifications offered by Maryland in support of its welfare limita-
tion was "a legitimate state interest ... in providing incentives for
family planning .... "89 Although the Court did not rely on this
justification, it did not deny its validity.
Two possible government actions have been mentioned, and
the list of hypotheticals could be extended almost indefinitely. A
carefully drafted population control statute, however, should be
able to withstand an equal protection challenge. Further vari-
ations on this theme will be found in the survey of possible
government actions.
V. POSSIBLE GOVERNMENTAL ACTIONS
Initially, it may be advisable to reexamine and revise existing laws
in light of the population problem. For example, laws which allow
refusal to bear children as grounds of annulment, and laws which
set the legal age for marriage as low as 14,90 indirectly encourage
population growth. Even the Comstock Acts,91 which prohibit the
importation and mailing of contraceptives, although not effectively
87 397 U.S. at 485.
88 397 U.S. at 485.
89 397 U.S. at 483-484.
9 0 See Blaunstein, Arguendo: The Legal Challenge of Population Control, 3 LAw AND
Soc. REV. 107 (1968).
9i importation, 19 U.S.C. § 1305(a) (1965), 18 U.S.C. § 1462 (1970); Mailing, 18
U.S.C. § 1461 (1970).
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enforced, are significant to the extent they reflect an official state
attitude.
In addition, the federal government could increase appropria-
tions to fund research in fertility control. The sooner a simple,
long-lasting, inexpensive, and safe means of reproduction control
is developed, the sooner the number of unexpected and unwanted
births will be reduced. The government should also ensure that
every person who wants birth control information has access to
it.92
The government should also consider revision of the tax laws.
Section 15 1(e) of the present Internal Revenue Code allows the
taxpayer a $625 exemption for each of his children. Soon that
allowance will be $750 per child.9 3 While these amounts are not
large enough to encourage people to have more children, the fact
that such exemptions are available certainly does not discourage
anyone from having additional children. Imposing a maximum
number of exemptions for natural born children might create such
a discouragement. 94 To avoid ex post facto problems, the Code
amendment should operate only prospectively.
Should the exemption method prove ineffective, Congress
might consider imposing an additional tax for having a third child.
The federal government can lay and collect two kinds of taxes,
direct and indirect.9 5 Direct taxes are not feasible since they must
be apportioned among the states. Therefore, any tax levied in a
population control program would have to be classifiable as an
indirect tax, i.e. a duty, an impost, or an excise. The fact that the
subject of the tax might be the exercise of a fundamental right (the
right to procreate, for example) would not invalidate it. In Stew-
ard Machine Co. v. Davis9 6 the Court stated that "natural rights,
so called, are as much subject to taxation as rights of less impor-
tance." 9 7 The Tenth Amendment would pose no real problem
even though matters like marriage, abortion and family life are
regulated by the state, not the national government. As the Su-
92 Senator Packwood's bill, note 79 supra, also has a section concerned with increasing
the availability of birth control information.
93 INT. REV. CODE of 1954 § 15 1(e).
94 The equal protection argument against the constitutionality of such a Code Amend-
ment was discussed in the text accompaning notes 84 and 85 supra. It should also be noted
that exemptions and deductions have traditionally been regarded as matters of legislative
grace, and of course, what the Congress gives it can take away. See BITTKER, FEDERAL
INCOME, ESTATE, AND GIFT TAXATION (3rd ed. 1964).
95 U.S. CONST, art. I, § 8; U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9.
96 301 U.S. 548 (1937). This involved a challenge to the statutory imposition of a tax on
employers of 8 or more persons, arguing that employment was a fundamental right and
therefore immune from taxation.
97 301 U.S. at 580.
[VOL. 4:1
Population Control
preme Court observed in another tax case involving the Tenth
Amendment:
The problem is plainly national in area and dimensions.
Moreover, the laws of the separate states cannot deal with it
effectively. Congress, at least, had a basis for that belief.98
Moreover, the Court established in United States v. Do-
remus,99 that as long as the tax appears on its face to have a
revenue raising purpose, the judiciary will not inquire into the
motives of Congress in enacting the tax. Recalling the uproar
during debate about the 1969 Tax Reform Act over the govern-
ment's loss of billions of dollars in revenue if the $250 exemption
increase were enacted, it must be granted that a third-child tax
would raise a great deal of revenue.
The excise classification is probably the only serious obstacle
to the success of a tax proposal of this type. Obviously, a tax on
having a third child would not be an impost or duty, and it is very
questionable whether it could be considered an excise. An excise
is a tax on an activity, and the subject of a population control tax
would not be an activity, but a child. The activity of conceiving
would not be the subject, because presumably a miscarriage or
abortion would excuse the taxpayer from payment. The giving
birth to a live child would not be the subject of the tax either, for
if the child lived but a few minutes or weeks, the parents would
presumably be excused. Therefore, the tax is probably a direct
one, a tax on the child, and as such would have to be apportioned
among the states. This apportionment, as noted above, is rela-
tively impossible.
The abortion laws should be repealed so that voluntary abor-
tion will be recognized as an acceptable means of personal popu-
lation control. Significant due process arguments against volun-
tary abortion revolve around the rights of the unborn child. 100
However, one commentator has argued that the due process prob-
lem would never be reached because repeal of abortion laws, or a
liberalizing of them, would not constitute state action. 10 1 He dis-
tinguished the situation in Reitman v. Mulkey,10 2 where an
amendment to the California constitution authorizing persons to
refuse to sell or rent real estate for any reason was held uncon-
stitutional by the Supreme Court, from repeal of abortion laws.
98 Helvering v. Davis, 301 U.S. 619, 644 (1937), a case in which the plaintiff argued
old-age benefit provisions of the Social Security Act violated the Tenth Amendment.
" _Doremus challenged his conviction under a statute making it unlawful for dealers in
drugs not to register with an Internal Revenue agent and pay the agent a $1 special tax.
100 Discussed supra part III.
101 Clark, supra note 63.
10 387 U.S. 369 (1967).
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Reitman dealt with the buying, selling and leasing of real estate,
activities which are all governed by law at every stage. Thus, any
change in the legal regulation of land transfer necessarily
involves state action. Abortion, on the other hand, is a medical
proscription. The author therefore concluded that state action
would not be involved by the elimination of all abortion restric-
tions from the statute books. 103
Compulsory abortion statutes would be another matter. The
state would surely first have to try all lesser methods of accom-
plishing its purpose and find them ineffective. The same would be
true for any compulsory sterilization law. Again to quote Clark:
The most serious difficulty with compulsory sterilization as
a birth control measure is that it interferes with one's capacity
and fulfillment as a human being in an intimate and irrepa-
rable way. The state should not exact this sacrifice of in-
dividuals unless voluntary methods have failed and popu-
lation growth has reached emergency proportions. 10 4
In addition, such laws could be challenged under the doctrine
articulated in Rochin v. California.0 5 In Rochin, the defendant
was convicted of possession of morphine. His conviction was
chiefly based on evidence obtained when, at the direction of an
arresting police officer, his stomach was pumped full of an emetic
and he vomited two morphine capsules. Speaking for the Court,
Mr. Justice Harlan reversed his conviction saying that such police
conduct "shock[ed] the conscience,"' 106 and thus deprived the
defendant of due process of law. Unless famine imperiled the
country, compulsory sterlization or abortion statutes might sim-
ilarly "shock the conscience" and be a denial of due process.
The listing above does not purport to exhaust the possibilities
for government action to control population. Indeed this comment
does not pretend to touch all the constitutional questions that
could be raised. However, it is hoped that a demonstration has
been made of the fact that, as usual, the United States Con-
stitution is flexible enough to allow the government to deal with a
national problem while it still protects those basic human values
without which many of us would not care to survive.
-Bettye S. Elkins
103 Clark, supra note 63, at 193.
104 Id.
15 342 U.S. 165 (1952).
106342 U.S. at 172.
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